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e Egyptian Islamic Group’s Critique of Al-Qaeda’s Interpretation
of Jihad
by Paul Kamolnick
[T]here is a diﬀerence in views between two visions of jihad. e vision of the Islamic Group
and the vision of Al-Qa’ida. . . [ey] . . . called for a jihad that puts the logic of challenge above
the principle of calculations, the preservation of interests, the availability of capabilities, and the
perception of the goals. --Isam Dirbalah [1]
eir[Al-Qa’ida’s] aim is jihad, and our aim is Islam – Najih Ibrahim [2]
Abstract
A specific branch of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh al-jihad) regulates the waging of the jihad of the
sword (jihad bis saif). In this article, a detailed exposition is presented of the Egyptian Islamic
Group’s (IG; Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya) use of fiqh al jihad against Al-Qaeda. e present author’s
‘jihad-realist’ approach is first briefly described; the IG’s critique of AQ systematically outlined;
and in conclusion, implications are derived for counter-radicalisation strategies.
Introduction
Intra-Islamist legal critiques of Al-Qaeda (AQ) should be carefully scrutinized for their
potential value in countering radicalization and recruitment to AQ’s global terrorism. e
present article extends the author’s previous research in two directions. [3] First, rather than
providing detailed shari’a proofs its primary focus is craing a more generalized, strategically
useful conceptual framework contrasting legitimate and illegitimate jihad. Second, it
reintroduces and illustrates the potential strategic potential of the generally neglected research
on shari’a produced by the Egyptian Islamic Group (IG; Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya) which
delegitimises unlawful jihad. e article is organized as follows. e present author’s ‘jihadrealist’ approach is first briefly described. e IG’s ‘Corrective Concepts Series’ (Silsilat Tahih
al-Mafahim) is then analyzed with specific attention to its carefully rendered contrast between
two visions of jihad, one rooted in mainstream Sunni jurisprudence and the other one alleging
a deviation from such. In a final section, conclusions are presented and brief implications
deduced for a counterterrorist messaging strategy.
A Jihad-Realist Approach
e IG’s critique of AQ’s alleged violations of the lawful jihad presumes that ‘jihad of the
sword’ (jihad bis saif), conceived defensively and oﬀensively, is an essential and enduring
religious prescription binding on all observant and eligible Muslims. [4] e acceptance of this
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jihad imperative therefore places the IG in the camp of those Islamists whose ultimate goal -a
state ruled by shari’a, and societal norms steeped in Islamicity - is derived from the same
Islamist textual universe as that of AQ. is presumptive religious prescription is key,
ironically, to the IG’s critique of AQ’s mass casualty terrorist modus operandi. Why so? As an
internal Islamist critique - one that relies on the same salafist understandings of the sources of
law and justifications for the militant expansion of the faith - should the IG prove that AQ is
guilty of violating the jurisprudence regulating the jihad (fiqh al-jihad), or causing great
misfortune to the Islamic Call and broader umma (Islamic faith community), AQ’s status as
‘salafi-jihadi’ vanguard is delegitimized. Let us now examine systematically, the IG’s case.
Correcting the Errors of Jihad: e Shari’a of Lawful Military Jihad (Fiqh al-Jihad)
e Corrective Concepts Series (Silsilat Tashih al-Mafahim)
e Corrective Concepts Series comprises approximately twenty independent publications
[5] produced by the IG’s ‘historic leaders’[6]: the five original members Abd al-Rahman,
Shaykh Salah Hashim, Karam Zuhdi, Usamah Hafiz, and Muhammad Shawqi al-Islambuli; it
also includes three others who joined early-on, Najih Ibrahim (generally regarded as the
group’s senior religious scholar and the one who contributed most to the Corrections), Asim
Abd-al-Majid, and Isam Dirbalah. Each historic leader was either a senior author, co-author,
or consultative reviewer, for these publications. At the time of their writing, all were serving
extended prison sentences and were leading members of the IG’s 15-member Majlis Al-Shura
(Consultative Council, the leading organ of the IG).
e first four publications provide a comprehensive, systematic refutation of the IG’s own
earlier misguided jihadism. Published in 2002, these volumes deal, respectively, with: an
introduction, overview, and explanation of the rationale for their declaration (in 1997) of a
unilateral, unconditional cessation of violence; [7] the shari’a of lawful military jihad;[8] the
shari’a governing takfir; [9] and, the shari’a regulating the practice of commanding right and
forbidding wrong (al-amr bi’l-ma’ruf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar).[10] e next year (2003)
witnessed the publication of three additional volumes, one illuminating the IG’s recollection of
its odyssey as an Islamist organization committed to the promotion of Allah’s Word and
Shari’a [11]; two others, of considerable interest to the argument of the present article, oﬀer
specific - and in this writer’s view, devastating - shari’a-based criticisms of AQ.[12] Other key
volumes examine from a shari’a and realistic point of view, the concept of Allah’s absolute
sovereignty (Al-Hakimiyya)[13]; oﬀer a refutation of the inevitability of a ‘clash of civilizations’
between Islamism and the West[14]; and also supplies another shari’a-based critique of AQ.
[15]
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Corrections, Not Revisions: a Return to the Mainstream Sunnite Orthodox Shari’a of the Lawful
Military Jihad.
ough sometimes referred to as ‘revisionism’ or ‘revisions,’ this writer holds that the
translation of the Arabic term as Corrections (Tas ’heeh) is more to the point since the latter
connotes a return to Sunni orthodoxy with regard to the legally sanctioned waging of the
jihad, and not as the former implies, a decisive reinterpretation of the chief objectives and
modalities of lawful conduct of jihad according to Islamic sources for making the Word of
Allah supreme.[16] It is noteworthy, however, that a revised interpretation of objective
contextual factors has led to a dramatic shi in the IG’s strategic assessments.[17]
e considered judgment of scholars like Peters (2005) and Salem (2002) is shared by the
writer of this article. Peters has declared that “[t]he new positions [c. 2002- ] on the jihad duty
of the Jama’a Islamiyya are not novel. ey agree with the doctrine of jihad as expounded in
the classical books on Islamic law. However, interest lies in their self-criticism and their
polemical nature, since they refute [their] previous militant positions and legal interpretations
calling for the indiscriminate use of violence.” [18] Salem similarly states that the IG’s works
rectify “a radical reinterpretation of a key Islamic concept [i.e. the application to current
Islamic governments of Sayyid Qutb’s (1906-1966) deviant interpretation of the concept
‘jahiliyya’], and also a radical divergence from classical Sunni political thought” and that the
“Gama’ah’s re-examination of its ideology and modus-operandi signals a triumph of nonconfrontational, non-revolutionary trends in classical Sunni political thought” .[19]
Jihad-Realism as Premise
e IG unequivocally states, in several passages, its commitment to the military jihad as a
binding religious imperative. Ali al-Sharif states (2007), for example, that “[j]ihad is a religious
duty, . . . ordained to crush sedition and shirk [polytheism] from the face of the earth.”[20] Dr.
Najih Ibrahim similarly states: “e initiative [to permanently and unconditionally cease
violence] did not invalidate jihad. e initiative states that jihad is a religious duty that will last
until Judgment Day. However, there are several controls and conditions for that duty. How can
it be said aer that that it invalidates jihad,” he concludes, “merely because it decided that the
conditions for jihad were absent in Egypt?” [21] In their chief work on the rules regulating the
jihad [22], authors Hamdi Abd-al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Azim, Najih Ibrahim, and Ali Mohammad
al-Sharif, declared in 2002:
Jihad in the cause of God [jihad fi sabil Allah] is the noblest and greatest of
endeavors. Since jihad requires the expenditure of wealth, the desertion of wives
and oﬀspring, the abandonment of domicile and homeland, and since it requires
the killing of people and the shedding of blood, it is only right that shari’ah should
surround it with the greatest controls and the most binding rules to prevent the
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shedding of blood in every place and for every reason, and also to prevent
disorderly conflict where the killer knows not why he is killing and the killed
knows not for what he is being killed!!
Peters, in his careful analysis of the IG’s Corrections reaches an identical conclusion to the
one of the IG. Considering the question whether the rejection of violence involves a rejection
of the jihad of the sword (jihad bis saif), he states that this “does not mean that the duty of
jihad has come to an end or lost its force, because, if the circumstances change, the jihad
becomes obligatory again. . . .e new positions on the jihad duty of the Egyptian Jama’a
Islamiyya are not novel. ey agree with the doctrine of jihad as expounded in the classical
books of Islamic law.”
It is therefore not a question whether jihad is a binding religious prescription: it
unquestionably is. It is a question of whether and how one is to conduct it by lawful and
prudent means. And it is precisely this question that profoundly and irremediably divides the
IG’s Corrections from the path followed by AQ. In the following section, this contrast is
systematically explored - first at the level of general vision, and then in relation to very specific
and binding provisions of the sharia of lawful military jihad.
e Ultimate Goal of Islam
Despite its ennobled provenance, the ultimate goal of Islam is, according to the IG, not
jihad, but Islam. Islam’s universal mission is to create a world in which the Word of Allah,
Lord of the Worlds, is proclaimed and the message of the Oneness of Allah and His righteous
path is universally and faithfully spread. It is also a world that has practically implemented
fundamental Islamic precepts and shari’a-based prescriptions and proscriptions as the basis of
all human social relationships. In this respect, Islam maintains with other universal faiths Christianity, for example - a universalist mission to spread the Truth of Salvation, to bring
persons to that Truth, and to transform individuals at the level of their internal psychological
being, interpersonal relations, social responsibilities and obligations.
is is evident when in IG writings it is stated that the Corrections demand a “return to
their original mission as preachers of God’s word who help guide His creatures to His straight
path” and that “[o]ur noble goal is what [God’s] messengers had told their peoples. Our goal is
to make people pray to their God, that is, guide His creatures. We must be courageous enough
to embark on any decision that we believe achieves this goal. We must also be courageous
enough to refrain from any decision that we believe puts a distance between this goal and us.
We must also have greater and greater courage to desist from any decision or step that some of
us actually takes if it becomes clear that it will not help us reach this goal.” [23] “e end in
this case,” the historic leaders declare, “is to guide people and call them to embrace Allah’s
religion. As for jihad, it is only a means to an end. . . [T]he ultimate goal is to guide people to
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the path of God. erefore we emphasize that reality in Egypt has proved that guiding people
to the path of God must be the first and last objective.” [24]
Jihad Not an End, but One Duty and One Means
Al Qaeda, in stark contrast, has, according to the IG, transformed jihad into a fetish and in
that process subverted its instrumental nature and relation to other Islamic duties. Jihad, as IG
historic leaders declare, is only one of several religious duties in Islam, is a means rather than
an end, and is only one means by which “to raise the banner of Islam”.[25] Najih Ibrahim
forcefully contrasts the diﬀerence between the IG and AQ by claiming that “he [Dr. Ayman alZawahiri] can see only one way forward, which is jihad, and he considers that anyone who
adopts any other option is a traitor.” [26] Ibrahim asserts against AQ when explaining the IG’s
refusal to join its violent terroristic campaign that it is “because their goal is jihad, whereas our
goal is Islam. . . . ” and that “Al-Zawahiri is committed to the theory that fighting is an
aim. . .” [27] Abd-al-Gahni, finally, states that “ . . . jihad is just a means to an end. e end in
this case it to guide people and call them to embrace Allah’s religion. . . [G]uiding people to
the path of God must be the first and last objective.” [28]
e ree Essential Conditions for Legitimate Military Jihad: Legality, Probability, and
Sincerity
According to the IG then, the ultimate goal for AQ is not Islam but Jihad for Jihad’s sake. In
its vision, all available means for promoting Allah’s Word have been reduced to one only—the
military jihad. is conception may be accurately characterized as “Jihadism” or perhaps
jihad-fetishism. But Jihadism is also, and especially for the IG, an unlawful and murderous
deviation; for it is not merely a doctrine that is at stake, but that AQ is guilty of conducting
forbidden and gravely sinful acts in the name of Islam, and that AQ has caused great harm to
the Islamic Call. Table 1(see below) provides a brief synopsis of these violations and can be
consulted to facilitate greater comprehension of the discussion to follow.
As can be seen in the le hand column of Table 1, the IG’s alleged case against AQ rests on
the three essential bases within orthodox Sunnite jurisprudence—legality, probability, and
sincerity—for the waging of the military jihad.[29] Let us consider each in turn.[30]
Legality
According to the IG, the military jihad must be waged lawfully. Lawfulness comprises two
distinct dimensions: unconditional, categorical prescriptions or proscriptions, independent of
consequences, vis-à-vis the taking of life (killing) of specific classes of person; and second,
judging the legality of jihad principally in terms of its consequences (beneficial, or harmful)
for the Islamic cause.[31]
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AQ’s Violation of the Lives and Property of Persons Protected by Law.
According to the IG, AQ has expanded its targeting to include categories of person that on
mainstream Sunnite legal grounds it is forbidden (haram) to target, including non-combatants
(‘civilians’) who are not at war with Muslims nor infringing the da’wa call to Islam, but also
various categories of person--not part of an organized military, male fighting force--involved
in generalized civilian pursuits who have not taken up arms. Specifically, it is forbidden to kill:
women, children, and the elderly; persons who are blind; a member of a protected nonMuslim group [dhimmi] who is not actively combating Muslims; religious monks; various
categories of non-combatants who labour, such as a slave, peasants, or crasmen who are
neither combatants nor resisting the Muslims; infidel merchants conducting business on the
basis of fair exchange and in peaceful commerce with Muslims; non-Muslim travelers, traders,
or tourists because they are dutifully owed a right to safety and personal security in their lives,
property, and honor (aman); persons on the basis of mere nationality or citizenship (e.g.
“Americans,” “British”); the numerous violations directly caused by the 9/11 hijacking of a
civilian aircra; [32] every and any Muslim in general; and, Muslims deemed ‘human shields,’
except under the most extraordinary, exacting, and catastrophic of circumstances.[33]
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Table 1: e IG’s ree Essential Conditions for Legitimate Jihad

e Probability of Harmful Eﬀects/Negative Consequences
According to the IG, a second condition for the lawfulness of jihad is that of a strong
likelihood that the military jihad will not lead to harmful eﬀects or negative consequences for
the Umma. e IG asserts the need “’to make benefits paramount in any action that the
Muslim or a Muslim group does” and that if a course of action involves potential harm
“[r]epelling harm has priority over obtaining benefits”.[34] e prioritizing of interests is vital
to the IG Corrections and suﬀuses their broader return to orthodoxy with a realistic cast that
99	
  	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

October 2013

PERSPECTI VES O N TERRORISM 	
  

	
  

	
  	
  	
  

Volume 7, Issue 5

obviously privileges rationalistically based actions over irrational, ill-considered plans and
their likely harmful results. e IG states:
[A]ny action should be dictated by the religious benefit, either when it is first
initiated or when it veers from the right course and has to be corrected. In other
words, any persons deciding to do something should put benefit above harm. If he
sees before he embarks on it or aer he starts it that the harm is paramount and
there is no benefit at all, then he should desist immediately. ere is no doubt that
this long experience has proved that this spilled blood and these grinding battles
have not brought any worthwhile benefit but resulted in too much harm. . . e
spilled blood and the slain people are from one religion and there are in addition
the feuds and hatreds that have filled souls. . . Someone might say: What about
the injustice and persecution from which we are suﬀering? We say: Patience. We
believe that the reward for patience here is better and weightier in the scales. All
the eﬀorts must rally to stop these futile actions that only bring destruction to a
people from the same religion.[35]
It is not only unlawfulness but imprudence and a brazen, reckless disregard for interests
that the 9/11 attacks were conducted, according to IG. A “well known principle for all those
involved in Islam” is that the interests of the group outweigh those of an individual, and those
of the group, the state. By violating this principle in order to pursue a personal vendetta
against the US, [36] Al-Qa’ida in “the 11 September incident . . . . caused the . . . newborn State
of Afghanistan to perish,” Najih Ibrahim concludes, “and the al-Qa’ida organization [also]
perished itself.”[37]
In sum, if the military jihad leads to greater harms, e.g. catalyzing widespread opposition to
Islam, increasing enmity against Muslims and, undermining the safety and security of the
Muslim Umma, or further empowering its enemies, then, on consequentialist grounds (i.e.
“the jurisprudence of results”) military jihad is prohibited. If the objective of jihad is to leave
the Umma in a better position aer the jihad than before, then only those actions that
contribute to power, sovereignty, security, honour, safety, and expansion are permissible.
Unlawful Killing Based on Alleged Apostasy (Takfir) of the Ruler or Regime
e IG’s extensive internal self-criticism led to a rejection of virtually all violence directed
at actually existing governments, whether autocratic and corrupt or not, in Muslim majority
societies. First, the costs to the Muslim community of violent rebellion almost always
outweigh the benefits. is is also well-attested in general Sunnite prohibitions against
sedition and violent rebellion.
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Second, actual takfir involves not merely dereliction, corruption, laxity, sinfulness, or an
inability or unwillingness to enforce the sharia, but an actual betrayal and treasonous
willingness to permit or invite the enemies of Islam to defeat the Islamic state. ird, the tasks
and unique responsibilities of those charged with statecra oen demand an engagement with
the world as it is, and the necessity of preserving and furthering one’s interests in a world very
much not of one’s choosing. It is therefore inadvisable to demand that purified religious
functionaries govern the state, and it is also necessary to understand the demands and
responsibilities of rulership. Fourth, youthful radicalism and impatience must be supplanted
by a long view and the embrace of a long-term evolutionary strategy, building from the
bottom-up, to win the society for Islam through da’wa, education, and reform.
Fih, the IG criticize their previous use of the concept ‘kufr al-nizam’ (unbelief of the
regime), since the concept ‘regime’ is a depersonalized abstraction, despite the reality that it
involves millions of persons involved in millions of tasks and thousands of institutions,
processes, products, and personnel required to conduct the state’s business. To say that a
building, or institution, or machine, or component of ‘the regime’ is apostate removes the
primacy of the individual person whose faith is being judged. Finally, and perhaps most
important, the IG subjects Sayyid Qutb’s rendering of the concept of Allah’s Absolute
Sovereignty (al-Hakimiyya) to withering criticism, and insist that God’s absolute sovereignty
creates the framework within which humankind, as Allah’s Vice-regents on earth, can and
should exercise legitimate authority and promote the best interests of the Umma.[38]
For the post-Corrections IG, takfir is the deviation at the core of extremist intolerance,
mindless violence, and hair-splitting internecine warfare among Muslims whose principal
occupation becomes judging the ‘Muslimness’ of others and heresy hunting, rather than
raising the Word of Allah. Najih Ibrahim’s recent article in relation to the rise of ‘takfiri groups’
in the Sinai launching violent attacks on the Egyptian army provides a vivid description of,
and warning against, this ultra-fanaticism. [39] One can easily imagine Ibrahim’s all-toopersonal reaction to those memories of his very own earlier dark descent into takfirism when
he declares: “We must fully realize that allowing takfir ideologies to spread in society will
inevitably lead to blood spilling. Mistaken concepts generate wrongdoing. ose who imagine
that there can be mistaken concepts without subsequent wrongdoing are deluding themselves.
Wake up . . . Egypt!” [40]
Probability as a Function of Strategic Realism, Capabilities, Conditions, Consequences
e decision whether to wage jihad bis saif, the IG asserts, must also be based on a hardheaded strategic realism that factors into account one’s capabilities relative to actual and
potential adversaries; objective and subjective conditions (i.e. socio-cultural and sociopolitical contexts, environmental variables of all sorts, necessary prerequisites for successful
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armed actions) required for the success of one’s own as well as enemy forces; and a realistic
assessment of the likelihood that the benefits to the Islamic Call of embarking on a policy of
armed military clashes outweigh its costs.
Strategic Realism
To be lawful, according to the IG, the jihad of the sword must be based on an objective
assessment of genuine historical, social, political, cultural, and economic realities. Especially
important is an objective assessment of one’s adversary’s motives, strengths, and capacities,
relative to one’s own. AQ’s reckless disregard for historical facts prevented AQ from conceiving
the U.S. as a self-interested actor whose interests were not necessarily unremittingly hostile to
those of the Islamic movements or Islam. “[A]ny observer of US strategy will find that the
prime mover of this strategy is US interests rather than the religious factor,” al-Minawi states
in paraphrasing the IG’s position and further he notes that this “explains many major events in
which the United States appeared to be supportive of some Islamic issues, such as support for
the Afghan jihad in 1979 against the Soviet presence.” As to post 9/11 US policies, he
continues, “the authors [i.e. IG co-authors] conclude that Al-Qa’ida’s strategy was one of the
most important factors that hastened the formulation of this US strategy that is negative
toward the Muslim world.” Instead than focusing on a pragmatic, realist interest-based
engagement with the United States which could, he states “have realized the interests of
Afghanistan” on the grounds of the US’s broader “strategy toward Central Asia,” it would be
“Al-Qa’ida’s strategy [which ] . . . hastened the formulation of that negative US strategy . . . that
led to the downfall of the Taliban Islamic State.” [41]
Moreover, strategic realism demands an objective acknowledgment of one’s own causal role
in history. In absolute contrast to AQ’s “Crusader-Zionist” conspiracy theory, or other wildly
rampant conspiracy theories produced to explain or excuse present-Muslim weaknesses, the
post-Corrections IG instead forcefully and self-consciously assumes ownership for its own
actions—including extremely destructive actions—and on that basis produced the Corrective
concepts required to re-launch their Islamist presence.[42] “[C]ontrary to the well-known
conspiracy theory,” Najih Ibrahim states, “[w]e . . . consolidated the great Qur’an principle,
which loosely translated reads that the plight of a person was of his own doing” and though he
admits it is true that various enemies conspire against each other, it is also the case that
conspiring does not represent the only will that makes the world go round, turns
the course of events, and interprets everything that happens in history. e
conspiracy theory truly means taking leave of one’s will so that only the will of the
CIA and the Mossad prevail. en we blame our mistakes and apathy on the
United States, the Israeli conspiracy, and other states, as if we had no role in
everything that happened in this world.[43]
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Having established the necessity of rejecting conspiracism and accepting historical agency,
it is requisite then that one carefully assess the strategic environment, i.e. the sum total of
forces and factors that one must attempt to take into account before conceiving, planning, and
executing any type of militant action. e IG counsels, for example, the necessity that “a young
man should try to read his reality locally, regionally, and internationally so that his acts and
behavior do not weaken his country and help its enemies defeat it.” [44]
Strategic realism also influences the manner in which one understands the process of
issuing legal opinions. A properly formulated legal opinion (fatwa) demands that one is
capable of correctly and carefully relating the worlds of legal judgment and empirical fact. As
Najih Ibrahim states, the “Shari’ah cannot be separated from reality. You must read both reality
and the relevant text before applying the right verses to the appropriate reality. Mistakes stem
from the fact that the right text is sometimes applied on irrelevant reality.” [45] Far from being
divorced from reality, “[i]t is an obvious mistake to take positions, pass judgment, and issue
fatwas . . . without looking at the reality, understanding its facts, and considering them one of
the principal reasons for these fatwas. Any judgment or fatwa,” they continue, “should be
based on two fundamental maxims: e reality and its facts and the religious evidence that is
in the Koran, the Sunna, or any of the recognized sources of jurisprudence.” [46]
is intrinsic relation between fatwa and reality also led to fundamental rethinking by the
IG about the nature of contemporary socio-political authority, governance, and the criteria
that may be used to evaluate the Islamic nature of modern Muslim-majority nation-states. It is
no longer possible, nor legally permissible, to apply classic fatawa produced under
dramatically dissimilar circumstances—for example, Ibn Taymiyya’s 14th century fatawa
produced aer the fall of Baghdad and the rise of Mongol rule over Muslim subjects— to
contemporary Egyptian society. e IG’s careful revisiting and rereading of those classic texts
led them to reverse their earlier judgment that the contemporary Egyptian state was analogous
to the medieval Mongol Tatar state. Finally, the IG determined that notions of Allah’s Absolute
sovereignty can and must also be made compatible with the rise of modern sociopolitical
orders such that humans are viewed as participating in a God-based, but human-administered
and executed, governing relationship.[47]
Capabilities and Conditions
e assessment of the probable success of a lawful military jihad requires that one
objectively assess one’s relative capabilities, conditions, and opportunities in relation to one’s
potential and actual allies and adversaries. e IG accuses AQ of neglecting this essential
condition since “Al-Qa’ida . . . called for a jihad that puts the logic of challenge above the
principle of calculations, the preservation of interests, the availability of capabilities, and the
perception of the goals.” [48]
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Moreover, the IG accuses AQ of wildly inflating their chances of victory and irrationally
expanding the scope of enemies they would simultaneously challenge. “Usama Bin Ladin was
aiming for what is called an impossible objective,” Najih Ibrahim states,” since he sought to
“expel Russia from Chechnya, India from Kashmir, and to attack Algeria, Tunisia, France, and
Libya, as well as evict America from the Gulf. All this is impossible,” he concludes, “even if Bin
Ladin possessed a superpower. Never in his life did the Prophet fight on two fronts or go to
war against two enemies at the same time.” [49] Summarizing the IG’s position al-Minawi
relates that “the leaders of Al Qa’ida entangled the Muslim nation in a conflict that was beyond
its power to wage, a conflict that it did not want.” [50]
Consequences
Finally, just as in the earlier discussion of legality, the probable consequences resulting from
launching a military jihad must be objectively assessed. Again, a hard-headed strategically
realist assessment should have led AQ to drastically revise its strategy of mass-casualty
terrorist attacks directed at multiple regimes throughout the Muslim and Western world.
Good strategy requires that one consider various dimensions of validity (e.g. suitability of
methods, sustainability of means, acceptability and legitimacy of ends, methods and means),
and also various factors associated with diﬀerent courses of action, and what strategic eﬀects
are likely to result from deliberate courses of action that will lead to transforming a given
equilibrium among conflict actors. [51] If judged by its strategic eﬀects, AQ’s strategy must be
judged a strategic catastrophe for the Muslim umma. Consider then the net result of AQ’s
strategic legacy recalling that the singular objective of the Islamist movement is to attain world
dominance, and to expand the sphere within which the Call and da’wa is enabled. Al-Minawi
succinctly summarizes these eﬀects: “1. It led to the collapse of the young Muslim state in
Afghanistan 2. Al-Qa’ida and the Islamic movements were hunted down as part of security
globalization 3. Al Qa’ida’s strategy hurt the interests and issues of the Muslim minorities [in
non-Muslim majority states] by deliberately confusing between terrorism and resistance
movements against occupation,. 4. It paved the way for the realization of Israel’s objectives and
designs.” [52]
Najih Ibrahim also links AQ’s failure to objectively assess capabilities and conditions to
disastrous strategic eﬀects when he states that “Bin Ladin believes in the principle of Jihad for
the sake of Jihad. Attaining the results is not important” and that “[w]hat matters for him is
that the Jihad embers should be fanned. is is wrong,” he continues, since “ Jihad was
ordained to bolster religion, not to spill blood . . . Bin Ladin fought the whole world. is is
why it is natural that he is defeated . . . and he cannot blame God but should blame
himself.”[53]
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Sincerity of Intentions
Sincerity is a final necessary condition for the lawful waging of the military jihad. ough
exceptions exist, for the most part the IG’s critique of AQ assumes the sincerity of its motives;
beyond what it deems AQ’s violations of the jurisprudence regulating the jihad (fiqh al- jihad)
then, the IG’s primary focus is pointing at AQ’s catastrophic practical and strategic failures
(prudence, interests). is is likely a pragmatic move since the IG seeks to persuade potential
or actual AQ followers and impugning motives is generally a losing strategy; however, there is
a genuine sense that Bin Laden’s ignorance and misguidedness rather than insincerity is the
greater culprit. [54]
e only legitimate motive for a Muslim to wage the military jihad is that it be pursued to
raise the Word of Allah and that the struggle be carried out exclusively in loyalty to that
objective: i.e. jihad in the path of Allah (jihad fi sabil Allah). Even if one has these sincere
intentions, however, the lawful military jihad must also factor in the possibility of harmful
eﬀects and if these eﬀects outweigh likely benefits, sincerity of motive must defer to a strategic
calculus of likely eﬀects.[55]
Conclusion
It is the present writer’s view that the jurisprudence regulating the jihad (fiqh al-jihad) is at
present under-exploited as a potential means for delegitimising AQ’s justification for the use of
terrorism. A detailed exposition of the IG’s shari’a-based case as presented in its ‘Corrective
Concepts Series’ (Silsilat Tahih al-Mafahi) leads to the following conclusions. ough the IG
and AQ regard jihad as an enduring, binding religious prescription, according to the IG, AQ
illegitimately isolates jihad as an end rather than a means, and the singular method of Islamic
faith and action when means are being considered. Second, according to the IG, AQ flagrantly
violates at least two of three essential requirements for the waging of the military jihad:
legality, probability, and to a lesser extent, sincerity. Al-Qaeda violates, they assert,
prohibitions against harming persons in their lives, honour, and property; and the moral
obligation to privilege vital interests and carefully calculate the probable consequences for
Islam and the Islamic Call likely to result from AQs terrorist actions.
ird, AQ’s strategic irrationality rests on many fabricated premises: a distorted account of
US interests vis-à-vis the Muslim world thereby underestimating potential bases of strategic
advance for the umma; the propagation of conspiracy theories instead of AQ’s admission that
it has voluntarily chosen a disastrous, counterproductive course; misapplications of medieval
jurisprudential fatawa to contemporary sociopolitical contexts; AQ’s failure to recognize the
living relationship in the present international context between sacred sources, judicial
opinions, and empirical realities. Al-Qaeda’s strategic irrationalism explains also its failure to
factor in the capabilities and conditions required for successful military jihad, and again, the
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probable strategic eﬀects likely to result from its strategic choices. Finally, AQ’s violation of the
sincerity criterion while less suspect, surfaced on those occasions when Usama bin Ladin’s
vengeance against the US obviously motivated his actions. More generally, however, sincere
intentions are no substitute for hard-headed genuine strategic planning and deemed an
insuﬃcient criterion for engaging in a legitimate and jurisprudentially sanctioned jihad. It is in
concrete results and consequences (or the lack thereof) for Islam and not ulterior motives, that
AQ’s strategic eﬀects on the Islamic Call and Word of Allah must be calculated.
A Policy Recommendation
It is advisable that scholars and government analysts suﬃciently trained in Islamic
jurisprudence systematically examine the orthodox sunnite fiqh al-jihad and its potential for
delegitimising Al-Qaeda’s anti-Western mass casualty terrorism. Should knowledgeable
experts conclude that such leverage exists, one could derive from this Islamist variant of the
legal instrument highly suggestive themes for strategic communication oﬀensives by US allies
and partners in the Arab and Muslim world. Finally, leveraging the shari’a of lawful military
jihad can and should facilitate a more eﬀective, precisely targeted means for reaching those
persons whose attachment to Islamic legality is a sin qua non for their own personal genuine
quest to raise the Word of Allah supreme throughout the earth. at this may also partially
facilitate the disruption, dismantlement, and eventual defeat of AQ is, in the end, a benefit for
all parties - Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Both stand to gain by ridding the world of alQai’da.
About the Author: Paul Kamolnick is a professor of sociology in the Department of Sociology
and Anthropology, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, Tennessee, USA. He teaches
courses in classical and contemporary social theory, and the sociology of global terrorism. He is
the author most recently of Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda: A Jihad-Realist Approach (US Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2012) and “Al Qaeda’s Sharia Crisis: Sayyid Imam and
the Jurisprudence of Lawful Military Jihad,” (Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 36, 2013, pp.
394-418).
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Usama bin Ladin has done?,” to which Zuhdi replies, “I say there is a diﬀerence between emotions and Islamic and logical calculations.” - See:
Makram Muhammad, “Egypt: Interview With Islamic Group Leaders on Recent Revision of eir Ideology.” Al-Musawwar in Arabic 21 June
2002.
[37]Cited in, Makram Muhamad Ahmad “Correction: Islamic Group Leaders Tour Prisons with Non-Violence Message, Wholesale Release—
adding editorial notation,” in Arabic in al-Musawwaar, 28 June 2002.
[38] For the Corrected conception and practice regarding takfir and also kufr al-nizam (unbelief of the regime), see summary in Peters, Jihad
in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 181. Al-Sayyid’s brief outline (Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, “e Other Face of the Islamist Movement,” p.
17) for summary of the IG’s 2002 Ban on Narrow Positions on Religion and on the Excommunication of Muslims (Hormat ab Gholw fi al-Din
wa Takfir al-Muslimin); and also, Y. Carmon, Y. Felder, and D. Lav, “e Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: An Ideological
Reversal,” 22 December 2006, p. 10. e concept al-Hakimiyya and its importance in both initiating and then ceasing violent rebellion is
extensively discussed in actual IG texts, interviews, and conference paper: Najih Ibrahim, Authority: Shari’a View and Realistic Vision (AlHakimah: Nzrah Shar’iyah wa Ru’yah Wagi’iyah), serialized in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, and partially available in English translation via
opensource.gov for 27 July 2005, 28 July 2005, 31 July 2005, 16 August 2005; see also excerpt in MEMRI, #1301, “Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya vs.
Al-Qaeda,” 27 September 2006, p. 3.
[39]Najih Ibrahim, “Egypt: Former Islamic Group Leader Condemns Attack on Army Unit in Sinai,” Al-Misri al-Yawm in Arabic, 9 August
2012.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Source: Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi, “Part 1 of Book Review: Egyptian Islamist Leaders Fault Al-Qa’ida’s Strategy,” in Al-Sharq al-Awsat
(Internet Version-WWW) in Arabic 11 January 2004.
[42] Najih Ibrahim, title not given, in Al-Misri Al-Yawm, “Egypt: Statement by Leading Islamic Group Figure Says No-Violence Initiative
Strong,” 2 July 2007.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Later in same interview Zuhdi similarly refers to the dangers if one is to “apply certain texts to the wrong reality.” See, Makrum
Muhammad Ahmad, “Egypt: Interview with Islamic Group Leaders on Recent Revision of eir Ideology,” 21 June 2002.
[46] Usamah Ibrahim Hafiz and Asim Abd al-Magid Mohammed, e Initiative to Cease Violence: A Realistic Vision and a View Based on the
Shari’a (Mibadarat waf al-‘unf: ru’ya wagi’iyya-wa-nazra shar’iyya), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002; in Muhammad Salah, “Egypt:
IG Outlines Reasons for Peace Initiative, Islamic Movements’ Future,” Al-Hayah in Arabic,2 February 2002, p. 5. Usamah Ibrahim Hafiz and
Asim Abd al-Magid Mohammed, e Initiative to Cease Violence: A Realistic Vision and a View Based on the Shari’a (Mibadarat waf al-‘unf:
ru’ya wagi’iyya-wa-nazra shar’iyya), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002, in Ahmad Musa, “Egypt: Islamic Group Leaders Confirm ‘No
Violence Initiative,’” in Al-Ahram in Arabic, 9 February 2002. See also: “e diﬀerence between Al-Qa’ida’s vision and that of the Al-Jamah
Al-Islamiyah surfaces on several levels: the level of understanding the provisions of the Shari’ah and their application to reality; the level of
understanding reality and its challenges; and the level of arranging the priorities.” ( In, Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi, “Part 1 of Book Review:
Egyptian Islamist Leaders Fault Al-Qa’ida’s Strategy,” in Al-Sharq al-Awsat (Internet Version-WWW) in Arabic 11 January 2004).
[47] Najih Ibrahim states in relation to these fatwa: “[W]e re-read some fatwas that were wrongly implanted in the past which led to great
evils, such as the fatwa concerning the Tatars. We came up with a very important conclusion, notably that the contemporary armies of Islamic
states are drastically diﬀerent from the Tatar armies. Consequently, the comparison is flawed.” Najih Ibrahim “Egypt: Statement by Leading
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Islamic Group Figure Says No-Violence Initiative Strong,” 2 July 2007. Regarding the principle of Allah’s Absolute Sovereignty, Ibrahim states
further in the same conference paper, “[W]e presented a view [on al-Hakimiyya] which was the product of much thought that we gave over
the issue of governance over the past years and the presumed relationship between rulers and ruled in light of the teachings and principles of
Islam. We said that one could not call a person a kafir because he did not rule by God’s principles. However, a person becomes kafir if he adds
ingratitude to negligence, or preferred the rule of men to that of God. We also mentioned the importance of what could be called the trial of
men, and proved that the rule of men did not have to clash with that of God the Almighty if it were in the right context defined for it by Islam.
Both rules complemented each other. . ..” (p. 5).
[48] Abd-al-Latif al-Manawi, “Egyptian Islamic Group Leaders React to Abu-Hamza Al-Masri’s Criticism,” in Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic; 4
July 2003.
[49] Makram Muhamad Ahmad (Editor in Chief), “Correction: Islamic Group Leaders Tour Prisons with Non-Violence Message, Wholesale
Release—adding editorial notation,” in Arabic in: al-Musawwaar, 28 June 2002.
[50] In, Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi, “Part 1 of Book Review: Egyptian Islamist Leaders Fault Al-Qa’ida’s Strategy,” in Al-Sharq al-Awsat (Internet
Version-WWW); in Arabic 11 January 2004.
[51] See, e.g. Harry R. Yarger, Strategic eory for the 21st Century: e Little Book on Big Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, February 2006, esp. pp. 70-71.
[52] See, Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi, “Part 1 of Book Review: Egyptian Islamist Leaders Fault Al-Qa’ida’s Strategy,” in Al-Sharq al-Awsat (Internet
Version-WWW) in Arabic 11 January 2004.
[53] See, Makram Muhamad Ahmad (Editor-in-Chief), “Correction: Islamic Group Leaders Tour Prisons with Non-Violence Message,
Wholesale Release—adding editorial notation,” in Arabic; in: al-Musawwaar, 28 June 2002. Najih Ibrahim, in another interview would also
summarize these consequences: “e [AQ] operations have achieved only ruin, destruction, and occupation for Islam and Muslims. ey
have weakened the Islamic countries politically and economically. Afghanistan is just one of the negative repercussions of the 11 September
attacks. For example, the [2003] bombings in Riyadh caused more damage to Saudi Arabia and Muslim countries in various fields than they
did to the United States and the West” (See, Muhammad Salah, “Egypt’s IG Ideologue Says al-Qa’ida’s Operations Bring Ruin, Weaken
Muslims,” in Al-Hayah in Arabic 28 May 2003, in www.opensource.gov.
[54] See, Muhammad Nasr Karum, “Egyptian Islamists on Impact of Bin Ladin’s Killing,” in Al-Quds al-Arabi Online in Arabic 4 May 2011
(orig. Arabic title englished: “Najih Ibrahim: Al-Qa’ida Will Not Be Able to Avenge Bin Laden Because of its Feebleness and Because its
Leaders are in Hiding.”), in www.opensource.gov.
[55] See, R. Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, pp. 182-183.
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